EU regulation concerning genetically modified products: an issue of food security or a measure of disguised protectionism? by Ana Santos & Jose Caetano
 










   
EU regulation concerning genetically modified products: an issue of 
food security or a measure of disguised protectionism? 
   
 
 
Ana Santos¹, José Caetano
2 
 
¹ Universidade de Évora, 
2 CEFAGE-UE, Centro de Estudos e Formação Avançada em Gestão e Economia 


















CEFAGE-UE, Universidade de Évora, Largo dos Colegiais 2, 7000-803 Évora - Portugal 




EU regulation concerning genetically modified products: an issue of food 








The biggest producers and exporters of agricultural products have been adopting the 
genetic engineering in order to improve the factors productivity and the firms profits  
In the last decade, the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) 
have  established  a  high  divergent  regulation  on  production,  distribution  and 
consumption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Apparently, the EU´s complex 
legislative framework related to GMOs was intend to satisfy the European consumers 
which are concerned about food safety and whish to make more informed choice about 
the food they eat. The aim of this paper is to understand the potential motivations 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Gene technology allows an organism to be altered by introducing genetic information 
from another organism, across species boundaries (ANZFSC, 2003). This technology, 
also  called  biotechnology,  has  been  used  in  sectors  such  as  agriculture  in  order  to 
increase the size of the crop that can be harvest from the same amount of land. For 
instance, particular traits have been added to the plants` genetic make up to reduce 
the need  for pesticides, to prevent insect and disease damage or to increase crops 
tolerance to drought (Paarlberg, 2002; Zarilli, 2005).  
 
However, no one has foreseen the widespread opposition or the strong public concerns 
elicited by the introduction of GM foods that took place especially in the EU markets. 
While firms with major interests in the sector, such as Monsanto, argue that OGMs 
protect the environment and reduce the starvation, opponents, such as the groups of 
consumers  and  environmentalist,  namely  the  Greenpeace,  contest  and  assure  that 
GMOs damage the environment, are responsible for allergic reactions in humans and 
increase the monopoly of the multinationals (Ackerman and Richardson, 2002).  
 
According to the International Service for the Acquisition of Agribiotech Applications 
(ISAAA) the global area of biotech crops increased approximately 47 fold from 1996 to 
2004 (James, 2004). In 2004, 29% of the global cultivated area was biotech (Zarilli, 
2005).  So  far,  the  main  genetically  modified  crops  are  corn,  cotton,  soybean  and 
canola, being the leading biotech crop countries the US, Argentina, Canada and Brazil. 
The US is the main producer and consumer of GM crops and the mandatory labelling of 
GM food is required only where the approved GM food has altered the characteristics 
when compared to its conventional counterpart (ANZFSC, 2003). In contrast, in the 
EU, only a few GM crop varieties were approved due to the moratorium imposed from 
1998  until  April  2004  that  has  limited  the  production,  imports  and  sell  of  the  vast 
majority of GMOs. Since then, strict rules requiring food labelling, traceability and a 
slow  process  of  approval  of  new  GM  varieties  has  a  similar  effect  (Jackson  and 
Anderson, 2005). 
 
Such high divergent regulatory policies have had a significant negative effect on US 
exports of food and agriculture products to the EU and led to a GM food US-EU trade 
dispute (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2003). Apparently, the European 
consumers behaviour, who exhibit strong uncertainty avoidance towards the unknown, 
was the main reason behind the EU moratorium and the strict regulation concerning 
OGMs.  However,  despite  the  fact  that  consumer  preferences  have  a  recognized   3 
influence  on  international  trade,  an  essential  question  remains:  were  in  fact  the 
European consumers the fuel of the US-EU dispute or were they merely used as pawns 
of protectionist interests? In fact, despite the economic rhetoric surrounding consumer 
sovereignty,  trade  policies  have  focused  on  the  supply  side  and  on  regulations.  In 
addition, some authors suggest that nations are seeking innovative ways to protect 
their domestic agriculture, namely through non tariff barriers to trade (OECD, 2003). 
 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  understand  why  US  and  EU  have  adapted  such 
different policies towards GM food. We aim to explore whether this issue is in fact a 
question of food security or just a protectionist measure against free trade.  
    
2. The EU legal framework for production and sale of GMO  
 
In  Europe,  prior  to  1998,  crops  such  the  GM  corn  and  soybean  were  viewed  as 
equivalent to conventional varieties, implying that they did not need a separate GM 
label.  This  approach,  which  requires  scientific  evidence  of  risk  for  human  health  to 
establish security measures, became unacceptable in the EU following the mad cow 
disease  (BSE)  crisis  in  1996.  This  crisis  undermined  the  credibility  of  official  food 
safety regulators, who had originally assured consumers it was safe to eat meat from 
BSE  diseased  animals.  As  a  consequence,  consumers  after  1996  began  to  mistrust 
authorities  on  GM  products  and  to  avoid  eat  this  type  of  products.  Consumer 
confidence  was  further  undercut  when  a  variety  of  groups,  led  by  Greenpeace  and  
green party leaders, started to attack GM food (Paarlberg, 2002).    
 
Invoking the Precautionary Principle
1, which allows measures to be adopted in case of 
uncertainty or insufficient information, the European Commission (EC) decided in 1998 
to place a moratorium on the approval of any new GM crop that lasted until April of 
2004.  As  a  result,  the  production,  the  imports  and  the  domestic  sales  of  GM  crop 
varieties in the European area were dramatically reduced. Apparently, the pressure of 
the EU consumers who wanted to make informed choices about what they eat, led the 
EC to set up a tighter regulation concerning labeling and traceability of food and feed 
products  produced  from  GMOs.  This  regulation  requires  labs  for  all  products  that 
contain  GMOs  above  1%  threshold,  and  also  call  for  procedure  to  ensure  the 
traceability  of  all  GM  foods  through  the  chain  of  production  and  distribution.  The 
traceability requirement obliges the operators to keep a record for five years of all the 
                                                 
1 The Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement permits WTO Members to provisionally adopt SPS measures in the 
absence of sufficient evidence.  
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individual  GMOs  that  have  passed  through  their  hands, including information  where 
they come from, and to whom they were sold or delivered. 
 
According to the EU, the regulation concerning the labeling was designed to enhance 
consumer  confidence  on  GM  foods  and  to  facilitate  consumer  informed  choices  by 
providing on labels more detailed and verifiable information about GM content of foods 
and feeds. Moreover, the EU hopped this proposal will reestablish consumer trust in 
official  food  safety  regulators.  On  the  other  hand,  traceability  of  GMOs  allows  the 
monitoring and checking of information given on labels, the monitoring of effects on 
the  environment  and  the  withdrawal  of  GMOs  which  are  potentially  dangerous  for 
human or animal health (Paarlberg, 2002).  
 
Díez (2005) argued that the EU policy by maintaining harsh standards of food safety is 
unfairly  discriminating  against  foreign  suppliers.  Roberts  et  al.  (1999)
2  who  have 
developed  a  classification  scheme  for  the  analysis  of  trade  barriers  in  agricultural 
markets, included labeling in the list of the technical barriers to trade. In fact, foreign 
suppliers  have  to  pay  for  different  labels  and  compliance  procedures  in  order  to 
conform to labeling standards that differ across national market. These additional costs 
can be so substantial that prevent some of theme from competing in the market and 
reduce trade (OECD, 2004).       
 
At the moment, international trade in GMOs has to take place according to the rules of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular those spelt out in the Agreement on the 
Application  of  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Measures,  the  Agreement  on  Technical 
Barriers  to  Trade  and  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariff  and  Trade  (GATT).  Since 
biotechnology is propriety technology, the  rules  of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights have to be taken in account on international 
trade in GMOs (Zarilli, 2005).  
 
3. Implications of the EU mandatory regulation for OGM on US-EU trade 
 
The EU and US are each other`s main trading partners and account for the largest 
bilateral trade relationship in the world
3. The main US exports on agricultural products 
are cotton, soybeans and corn. In 2004, about 45% of the corn, 85% of soybean and 
                                                 
2 Cited by “Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development” (OECD, 2003) 
3  More  detailed  information  can  be  found  at  the  Web  site  of  the  Directorate  of  External  Trade  of  the 
European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/index_en.htm.   5 
76%  of  cotton  planted  in  US  were  GM  varieties  (Pew  Initiative  on  Food  and 
Biotechnology, 2005). Furthermore, in 2003, the US was responsible for 2/3 of the GM 
crops produced in the world (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2003), which 
shows the importance of this country as a global source of GMOs. 
 
In this context, the EU moratorium has had a significant negative effect on US exports 
to the EU. As a consequence of the US loss of market share, the American Bureau 
Federation estimated a global loss of 300 million dollars per year. The decline of corn 
exports to the EU was dramatic: the EU share of total corn export market had fallen 
from 4% in 1998 to less than 0.1% in 2004. In the other hand, GM soybean exports to 
the EU have not been affected by the moratorium because the EU had approved one 
variety  of  GM  soybean  prior  to  1998  that  American  soybean  producers  planted  in 
exclusive. Since the EU market has a significant share (11.7% in 2004) of US soybean 
exports,  American  producers  have  been  reluctant  to  introduce  new  GM  soybean 
varieties that have not been approved for the EU market. However, soybean exports to 
the EU have fallen (from 9.8 million tons in 1995 to 3.6 million tons in 2004). The EC 
argued that this decline is more likely due to the increased competition from lower cost 
producers such as Brazil, whose exports have risen from 3.0 million ton in 2005 to 9 
million tons in 2002 (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2005). 
 
In August 2003, the US, Canada and Argentina challenged the EU moratorium in the 
WTO, since food industry and farms of these countries have seen the moratorium as a 
clear infringement of WTO trade rules. In September 2006 a WTO dispute panel has 
decided  against  the  EU`s  application  of  its  approval  process  for  GMOs.  The  panel 
rejected  the  EU`s  defence  of  the  national-level  bans  as  precautionary  measures, 
arguing that enough scientific evidence was in fact available to carry out an adequate 
risk assessment (Bridges Trade BioRes, 2006).  
 
4. Public sentiment about OGM in US and EU  
 
 
Why has the EU not followed American adoption of GM food? The conventional wisdom 
is  that  Europeans  have  less  trust  in  their  food  safety  regulators  than  Americans 
(Jackson and Anderson, 2005). In fact, public opinion polls revealed that Europeans, in 
particular  those  of  the  North  of  Europe,  tend  to  trust  consumer  and  environmental 
groups  while  screening  little  trust  in  institutions  such  as  government  (Zechendorf, 
1998). This is important since groups of consumers and environmentalists have been 
actively involved in campaigns against OGMs. In an opposite way, Americans tend to 
trust scientific and academic sources of information while tending to have very little   6 
trust  in  consumer  and  environmental  groups  (Lang  e  Hallman,  2005).  Similarly, 
Loureiro and Hine (2004) suggested that whereas American consumers say they would 
like  GM  foods  to  be  labelled,  they  remain  confident  in  the  policy  of  the  Food  Drug 
Administration (FDA) that does not require such labelling. This is also consistent with 
the  historically  high  level  of  trust  American  consumers  have  had  for  regulatory 
agencies like the FDA. 
 
Some  authors  have  suggested  that  EU  rejection  of  GMOs  is  linked  to  fear  of  the 
unknown  and  risk  averting  (Gaskell  et  al.,  2003;  Laros  and  Steenkamp,  2004). 
According to Vogel (2001), Europeans are more risk averse than Americans, especially 
with  respect  to  issues  of  public  health.  However,  the  Pew  Initiative  on  Food  and 
Biotechnology  (2005)  argued  that  concerns  on  food  safety  are  not  the  only  factor 
influencing EU public opinion about GM crops and food. This research project pointed 
out that historically Europeans have a deeper cultural connection to their food than do 
most Americans. In Europe, in spite of the increasing of the supermarkets, they have 
not entirely replaced the traditional markets and the local specialized providers, such 
as  bakers  or  butchers.  In  the  other  hand,  most  American  consumers  have  little 
relationship with the food production process and acquire food from big supermarkets.  
 
The  GMOs  issue  is  not  a  major  source  of  controversy  in  the  US.  This  is  partially 
explained  by  the  fact  that  Americans  remain  relatively  unaware  of  agricultural 
biotechnology itself (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2005).  Hallman et al. 
(2004)  stressed  that  less  than  half  of  Americans  realize  that  foods  containing  GM 
ingredients are sold in supermarkets and less than one in three believe that they have 
personally  consumed  GM  foods.  These  authors  argued  that  it  is  unlikely  that  many 
Americans  are  aware  that  there  is  a  worldwide  controversy  surrounding  the  OGMs: 
little more than a third of Americans have heard of European demonstrations against 
GM  foods,  and  less  than  a  quarter  were  aware  of  the  refusal  of  African  nations  to 
accept US GM food aid. 
 
Though Americans claim they are interested  in various topics related to agricultural 
biotechnology,  only  about  one  in  five  Americans  say  they  have  discussed  the  topic 
more than once or twice with anyone (Hallman et al., 2004), a figure comparable to 
that  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Greece,  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Belgium,  though 
considerably less than Europe as a whole and substantially less than such countries as 
Germany  and  Denmark  where  reported  discussion  is  at  its  highest  (Gaskell  et  al., 
2003).  In  general,  Americans  are  more  optimists  about  biotech  products  than   7 
Europeans and see the technological progress as a positive sign of economic and social 
development (Gaskell et al., 2003).  
 
The differences on the agriculture scale and structure in the US and Europe may be 
another important influence on the EU public opinion towards GMOs. In the US farms 
are private property and often posted against intrude. Besides, agriculture in the US 
typically occurs on farms that are set apart from the urban centres. In contrast, in 
many parts of Europe, farms are much smaller and located closer to the urban centres 
and often adjacent to or in natural areas. Furthermore, the agricultural lands, in spite 
of  being  private  property,  may  be  crossed  by  hikers  in  some  countries.  These 
differences may help to make clear why many in Europe see what happens on farms 
as occurring in nature and why many in US see farming as something separated from 
nature (Zechendorf, 1998). 
 
Finally,  the  media  are  the  main  way  to  convey  information  about  the  scientific 
knowledge,  like  agricultural  biotechnology,  to  the  majority  of  the  consumers.  The 
presence or absence of an issue within the media plays an important role in public 
awareness and participation in that topic. The American press has not covered the GM 
foods topic extensively. That explains, probably, why so many American consumers 
seem  apathetic  toward  this  topic.  The  European  press,  however,  has  covered  the 
biotechnology issues rather extensively, and this may have had an effect on public 
awareness  and  opinion,  driving  European  consumers  to  be  both  cognizant  of  the 
technology and wary of it (McInerney et al., 2004).  
 
5. Is there a market for GMO in Europe?  
 
Since  April  2004  a  tough  labelling  law  for  GM  food  has  been  in  force  in  the  EU. 
However, and contrary to the expectations, consumers rarely find labels indicating the 
use of genetic engineering (GMO-Compass, 2006). Most the EU food companies have 
expressed  their  confidence  in  the  safety  of  biotechnology.  Nevertheless,  they  have 
pointed  out  that  they  avoid  putting  GM  label  on  their  products  because  consumers 
perceive label as health warnings rather than a way of conveying information about 
the application of genetic engineering.   
 
The results of a Eurobarometer poll suggested that the opposition to the crops and the 
food GM has been decreasing gradually in the last years among the Europeans, though 
the majority of those inquired confirmed that they will continue to reject GMOs despite 
any potential benefit associated to them.   8 
 
Trade association, representing the EU food companies (CIAA), stated that the new 
labelling rules do not have a helpful effect in terms of facilitating consumers informed 
choices, as it was the announced objective of the EU, since there are very few GMO 
labelled  products  on  the  market  and,  therefore,  customers  have  no  opportunity  to 
exercise  choice.  The  CIAA  stressed  that  food  industry  and  retailers  are  avoiding 
products displaying GMO labelling in response to consumers` preferences for non-GM 
products.  Apparently,  no  firm  wants  to  take  the  risk  of  suffering  competitive 
disadvantage due to lobbying moved by anti-GMO activists. As a result, CIAA argued 
that  industry  will  take  all  measures  to  guarantee  that  products  on  the  market  are 
derived from conventional plant material (ASA, 2006). Many producers have already 
changed  the  composition  of  their  products  replacing,  for  instance,  soy  lecithin  by 
emulsifiers.  Other  producers  are  paying  out  a  premium  for  soy  with  a  written 
guarantee  that  GM  content  does  not  exceed  the  0.9%  threshold  (GMO-Compass, 
2006).   
 
The CIAA suggests that if it was the intention of the EC to create an OGMs market in 
Europe,  then  the  EU  needs  to  go  over  the  scope  of  the  regulation  or  undertake  a 
massive consumer education programme. This is because consumers` behaviour does 
not change rapidly but over time. Some authors secure that the old consumer’s habit 
has to be “unfrozen” before a new one is acquired (Lewin, 1958 cited by Magnusson, 
2004). The educative campaigns have an important role in this process since they may 
reverse the impact of media scare stories and the undermining of confidence in the 
safety of GM derived food products engendered by anti-GM activists.  
 
6. What`s behind the regulation concerning OGMs in EU and US?  
 
A first step in solving the GM food US-EU trade dispute is to understand the true EU 
policymakers` motives. What is behind this trade dispute? The EU moratorium and 
strict  regulation  concerning  OGMs  was  intended  to  satisfy  consumers`  desires  to 
make  informed  decisions  about  the  food  they  eat  or  was  a  hidden  protectionist 
measure?  
 
Consumer  groups  such  as  the  European  Consumer  Organization  (BEUC)  and  the 
European  Organization  of  Consumer  Cooperatives  (EuroCoop)  have,  certainly, 
influenced EU policy. Furthermore, environmental groups opposed to GM foods have 
flourished at the same time. However, that is unlikely to be the main reason for the 
policy  difference  between  the  counterparts,  since  both  groups  have  been  active  in 
America as well (Jackson and Anderson, 2005).     9 
 
Thornsbury and Fairchild (2004) argued that as consumer preferences become more 
important in international trade, some groups of interests will attempt to influence 
those preferences. Therefore, and despite the dignified goals of the consumer groups, 
their pursuits may have been manipulated and influenced by political and economic 
interests of the EU.  
 
So far, there is no evidence that GM food can be more toxic or carcinogenic, result in 
more  allergies,  or  be  less  nutritive  than  GM-free  food.  Moreover,  no  evidence  was 
found  that  the  modified  genes  may  survive  digestion  and  alter  the  genome  of  the 
person  or  animal  consuming  them.  A  report  issued  by  eminent  scientists  and 
published by the UK government found no adverse effects anywhere in the world. Like 
other  reports  it  concluded:  “the  risks  to  human  health  are  very  low  for  GM  crops 
currently on the market”. Moreover, no theoretical reason or empirical evidence was 
found  in  the  study  to  suggest  that  GM  crops  “would  be  any  more  invasive  or 
persistent,  or  toxic  to  soil  or  wildlife  outside  the  farmed  environment  than 
conventional crop varieties, or spread their genes to other plants” (King, 2003). 
 
This suggests the need to consider the influence of producers and economic interest 
on the EU policy towards GMOs as well. Anderson et al. (2004) developed a political 
economy  model  that  takes  into  account  the  political  influence  of  special  interest 
groups,  namely,  farmers.  Their  results  showed  that  consumers  or  environmentalist 
opposition to GM crops were not the only reasons behind the EU moratorium and the 
strict  EU  regulation  concerning  OGMs.  These  authors  suggested  that  difference  in 
comparative  advantage  in  the  adoption  of  GM  crops  might  have  been  sufficient  to 
explain the different trans-Atlantic GM policies. 
 
On the one hand, the optimal response of farmers in a country with a comparative 
advantage in GM technology may be to lobby for lax controls of GM production and 
usage. On the other hand, farmers in a country with a comparative disadvantage in 
GM adoption can obtain cost advantage by lobbying for more strict GM standards.  
 
The US farmers have strong interest in a lax GMO regulation of production, in order to 
exploit the new technology before it is disseminated beyond the US. They also have a 
strong interest in a low degree of GMO consumer regulation either at home either in 
their export markets, given that they supply more than half of global exports (Jackson 
and Andersons, 2005). In fact, US producers will be less competitive if they have to 
comply with EU labelling and traceability rules since they drive up prices. International   10 
financial  consultancy,  KPMG,  estimated  that  mandatory  labelling  in  Canada  would 
result in an increasing cost equal 35-41% of producer prices. It is important to stress 
that KPMG study did not include any cost estimates for the numerous products recalls 
that will inevitably occur annually due to accidental “GMO” mislabelling (ASA, 2006). 
As  Holm  and  Kildevang  (1996)  pointed  out,  price  is  a  powerful  determinant  of 
consumer choices.  
 
The US agricultural biotechnology firms,  also  have a  clear boost  for promoting GM 
adoption. Since they were more prevalent, more politically influential, and/or more 
advanced  in  the  US  than  in  the  EU,  that  would  be  an  additional  reason  for  the 
observed difference in GM policies (Anderson et al., 2004).   
 
In contrast, EU farmers have strong interest in a high degree of GMOs regulation of 
production  and  distribution.  Even  if  they  could  benefit  from  a  more  productive 
technology,  the  first-available  GM  food  crops  (corn  and  soybean)  are  not  of  major 
importance to them. Besides, GM technology would be less profitable in the European 
landescape since non-GM crops and nature areas are much closer than in US. That 
would  required  more  buffer  zoning  per  hectare  of  GM  crop  in  Europe  than  in  the 
broad-acre landscapes of US. As a consequence, for EU small farmers, the potential 
productivity gains may be offset by the management cost of buffer zoning. Therefore, 
there would be a higher number of EU than US farmers that will continue to produce 
just  non-GM.  That  proportion  would  be  higher  as  greater  would  be  the  opposition 
against the environmental and consumer groups to the selling GM foods in Europe.    
Other important issue that probably European farmers are taking into account is the 
extent to which their crop products are internationally competitive. Since the US and 
other  countries  have  already  adopted  GM  technology,  EU  producers  may  be  more 
competitive in their own and in third country markets due to the fact that consumers 
in those  markets  are  GM  averse,  and  more  so  the  stricter  are  policies  towards  GM 
foods.  The  EU  livestock  producers  are  unlikely  to  benefit  as  much  from  the  GM 
technology  as  the  more  corn  and  soybean  intensive  livestock  producers.  Therefore, 
they also could support anti-GM policies (Jackson and Anderson, 2005). 
 
Jackson and Anderson (2005) suggested another possible reason for the EU`s strict 
GM food policy. They hypothesized that government is giving EU biotech firms time to 
catch up with American competitors so that intellectual property  rights are paid to 
domestic rather than foreign patent holders. The slow approval process of new GM 
varieties in EU may, probably, support this idea. 
   11 
7. Final remarks 
 
The controversy surrounding the GMOs continues to be emotional due to the lack of 
conclusive  scientific  evidence  on  the  current  or  potential  impact  of  agricultural 
biotechnology on human and animal health and on environment. The EU and the US 
have  adopted  domestic  regulation  on  the  approval,  labelling  and  documentation 
requirements for GMOs that varies substantially. Apparently, the EU tight mandatory 
labelling and traceability of GMOs was intend to satisfy the European consumers who 
are concerned about food safety and whish to make more informed choice about the 
risks  related  with  the  food  they  eat.  However,  some  authors  suggested  that  this 
regulation just meant to protect the interests of some agents of the EU. The discussion 
presented above take us some way towards arguing that, apparently, in the case of 
OGMs the European consumers were used as pawns of protectionist. The exploratory 
nature of this paper stressed the importance of consumer preferences on international 
trade disputes and how those preferences can potentially be manipulated by organized 
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